Chapter Seven: Christianity as Church

In this, the second longest chapter, Rahner shows that the Church belongs inextricably with Christianity itself. Part 1 explains that the Church is not the primary truth of Christianity, but still fundamental. Part 2 explains what it means to say that the Church was founded by Jesus Christ. Jesus did not personally authorize all the explicit features of later Christianity, but he gave them to the Church as possibilities. Part 3 shows the relation between the Church and the New Testament. Rahner synthesizes the various NT portraits of the Church, showing the church as a structure, as a unity of various local churches, and as united in Christ. In Part 4, Rahner outlines what he calls the "fundamentals of the ecclesial nature of Christianity." Christianity can be said to be autonomous and a divine law unto itself. For that reason, it belongs to the necessary historical and social mediation of salvation.

Photo by Adolf Waschel. Scanned from Karl Rahner in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews, 1965-1982. Edited by Paul Imhof and Hubert Biallowons. Translation edited by Harvey D. Egan. New York: Crossroad: 1986. Photo appears between pages 186 and 187.

Part 5 offers, in 24 pages, an "indirect" method for showing the legitimacy of the Catholic Church. Rahner begins the method by offering three "norms" for authentic Christianity: it existed from the beginning until Reformation times, many find it in Catholic Christianity, and it operates in an authoritative way independent of the believer. These norms undergird Catholic Christianity. In Part 6, Rahner argues that the formation of the scripture is a "fundamental moment" in Christian tradition, not a separate source of truth alongside of tradition. Part 7 defines the Church's teaching office. It helps the Church to persevere in the truth because it confronts Christians with the challenging demand of Christ to believe, i.e., to enter into a living relationship with God. Part 8 suggests that Christian life is necessary but limited. Just as we are bound to our families, even in recognizing their limitations, says Rahner, so we are bound to the church.

Part 1: Introduction

(VII.1, p. 322). In this first part, Rahner claims that the ecclesial aspect of Christianity is not an adjunct to personal faith in Jesus Christ. No, faith concerns the whole human person, whose nature is interpersonal. The ecclesial nature of the Church corresponds to the interpersonal nature of human beings (A). The ecclesial dimension is not, however, the primary dimension of Christianity. There is a hierarchy of truths, and ecclesial consciousness is subordinate to higher truths (B). Rahner explains that he does not intend to offer a full justification for believing that Catholic Christianity is the one church intended by Christ. Instead, he wants to show why Catholic Christians may confidently trust in the church handed down to them.

A. The Necessary Institutional Mediation of Religion and Its Special Nature in Christianity (VII.1.A, p. 322). What is the church? Rahner calls it “The historical continuation of Christ in and through the community of those who believe in him, and who recognize him explicitly as the mediator of salvation in a profession of faith” (322). Then he makes three initial observations.

First, Rahner acknowledges that the period since Jesus can be called "the period of the church," because after Jesus our hope has acquired a new and eschatological character. But then he qualifies his observation, perhaps out of fear of sounding triumphalistic. He insists that even the period before Jesus was "encompassed by God's salvific will" (322).

Second, he remarks that the Christian understanding of religion is necessarily ecclesial. Human beings, he says, are "co-determined" by interpersonal communication. Such communication belongs to the church as well, for religion concerns the whole of human existence, even the interpersonal.

Finally, he notes that many thinkers in the nineteenth century lost sight of this "institutional" aspect of the church. They thought they could appropriate religion in a private kind of interiority. But today we acknowledge that an individual cannot discover personhood by looking for it as something contrary to his or her social nature.

B. The Doctrine of the Church is Not the Central Truth of Christianity (VII.1.B, p. 324). One could easily find in the Catholicism of recent centuries a kind of “militant ecclesiality” which expressed an extreme reaction against individualism. This extremism proclaimed that belonging to the church is “the most specific and central thing about Christianity” (324). Rahner rejects this view. He notes that many dimensions of Christianity – such as the Sermon on the Mount, love, and the freedom of the spirit – might be considered “suspect” in such a militantly ecclesial climate.

Against this militancy, Rahner (quoting Unitatis redintegratio, no. 11) reminds readers of the doctrine of the hierarchy of truths. There are many truths in Christianity, and not all of them are equally foundational. The doctrine of God, for example, is more fundamental than ecclesial consciousness.

C. The Difficult Question About the Church (VII.1.C, p. 324). The difficult question is, “Why [do] we believe that our concrete church is the church of Jesus Christ”? (324). It would be difficult to answer this question, says Rahner, so as to do full justice to the traditional assertions about the church in Catholic theology. To answer the question fully, one would have to (1) analyze the treatment in Matthew 16 of the apostolic office, and (2) show why an episcopacy with apostolic succession belongs to the church which Christ intended. Rahner says that such an answer is beyond the scope of the Foundations.

His intention is rather to reflect, as a Catholic Christian, upon his membership in the church. He wants to show that he and other Christians have no reason to cast doubt on the church handed down to them in their existentiell situation.

Part 2: The Church as Founded by Jesus Christ

(VII.2, p. 322). In this second part of Chapter VII, Rahner raises his fundamental, pastoral question: with what right can a Catholic Christian confidently assert that his or her church is the church intended by Jesus Christ? The issue is not whether Jesus intended a church, but rather what features he intended (A). In order to answer this question, Rahner lays out three minimal presuppositions: Jesus proclaimed a historical event (i.e., the kingdom of God), he drove a wedge between his followers and the Jews, and he foresaw his death (B). The major difficulty is proving that Jesus intended a church, because the church cannot establish a relation to Jesus on its own (C). In order to resolve the difficulty, Rahner lays out some basic principles, the first of which is that Jesus intended God’s Word to remain as a permanent presence in the world (D). Next, he applies his principles to the question of continuity. We do not have to show that Jesus authorized all the explicit features of later Christianity, but only that they were possibilities given by Jesus (E). Finally, Rahner lists the four concrete historical acts by which Jesus can be said to have founded the church, namely, his gathering of disciples, his teachings which they maintained, the power he bestowed on them to continue his work, and the position he granted Simon Peter (F).

A. The Question (VII.2.A, p. 326). “Is my church the church intended by Jesus Christ?” The question is fundamental, says Rahner, because it focuses on the connection between Jesus Christ and the church. Rahner rejects the 19th-century view that the church is merely a spiritual community without an institutional dimension. Anyone who advocates the unity of the churches, he says, must reject that view.

But Rahner is not opposed to at least entertaining the question of whether Jesus, with his imminent expectation of the kingdom in a temporal sense, intended to found a church. He allows the question but answers it by expressing what he takes to be a scholarly consensus. Most scholars recognize, he says, that "something like the constitution of the church is found soon after Easter" (327).

The fundamental debate is not whether a church was intended, but rather what features belong to it. Did Jesus intend the primacy of Peter, the role of the Twelve, and the apostolic succession. In addition, there is a still more essential question: was there, in New Testament times, one church among the many which could claim to be the church intended by Christ?

B. Presuppositions for the "Founding of the Church" by Jesus (VII.2.B, p. 327). In order to contend that Jesus founded the church, Rahner insists upon three presuppositions:

The first is that Jesus did not intend to teach universal religious ideas so much as he meant to proclaim that a historical event. The event was the breaking-in of God's kingdom, had been achieved in his person.

The second was that his teaching drove a wedge between his followers and the Jews. Why? Because he offered salvation to everyone, not just to his own ethnic group or to an ascetical sect like the Essenes.

The third was that Jesus foresaw his own death. He also foresaw that, through his death, the victorious closeness of God's kingdom would be fulfilled. Moreover, he foresaw that there would be a period of time between his death and the arrival of God's kingdom. During that period, faithful Christians would have to wait.

Unless one accepts these minimal presuppositions, one must believe that Jesus acted unreasonably up to and during his passion. He could teach universal ideas without dying, he did not have to proclaim salvation to all, and there was no need to promise the kingdom if he disbelieved in it.

C. The Thesis and Its Problem (VII.2.C, p. 328). The meaning of the thesis, “Jesus founded the church,” is that the church has its origins in Christ. The church does not establish a relation to Jesus “autonomously and by itself.” Rather, the establishment of the church is “an act of Jesus and not primarily an act of the church itself” (329).

Rahner concludes this short article with a series of questions: could Jesus have intended that his narrow circle of disciples "would ever continue with essentially the same function in what we see in the church later as bishops?" (329). Could Jesus foresee a juridical organization? Could he foresee the privileged position he bestowed upon Cephas as a permanent institution?

D. The Attempt to Respond: The Principles Involved (VII.2.D, p. 329). Rahner wants to clarify the sense in which one can say that Jesus “founded” the church. In order to do so, he lays out some basic principles, principles that lead to a minimal but affirmative assertion.

First, he says that Jesus, as absolute saviour and God's self-communication, intended God's Word to be a permanent presence in the world. Jesus would not have been who he is "if the offer of himself which God made in him did not continue to remain present in the world in an historically tangible profession of faith in Jesus" (329-330). Insofar as faith in God's self-communication has its origins in Jesus, the church has its origins in him.

Second, the faith of the church is a public profession. It is the faith of a community. Since faith is communal, and has its origin in Jesus, the church has its origin in him.

Third, the faith that forms community must have a history, and be part of salvation history. In this history, every later epoch continues to have its origin in an earlier epoch, even when it diverges from it. "In order that a historical decision in one epoch be binding for later epochs for the sake of preserving historical continuity, all that can be seriously required is that this decision lay within the genuine possibilities of the church's origins and does not contradict these origins" (331).

E. Application to the Problem of Continuity Between Jesus and the Church (VII.2.E, p. 331). Having accepted the principles articulated by Rahner in the previous article (namely, the principles of the believers’ faith, of their public profession, and of the nature of historical continuity), one can then draw important consequences.

First, we can assert that the church was founded by Christ if we can say that later decisions of the church, now termed "binding," were at least possibilities given through Jesus.

Second, we do not need (according to Rahner's method) to trace back to the sayings of Jesus concrete structures such as a permanent Petrine office or a monarchical church constitution.

If it is fair to grant these two consequences, then we can grant that the church developed freely "from out of her origins in her full essence" (332).

F. The Acts of Jesus Which Founded the Church (VII.2.F, p. 332). Can we point to definite acts of Jesus, acts which Biblical scholarship can show belonged to the historical Jesus, acts that did in fact “found” the church? Relying mainly upon the work of New Testament exegete Rudolf Schnackenburg, Rahner notes three such acts:

First, Jesus did gather around him disciples who in turn assembled a "people of God." The significance of the Twelve was to recall the 12 tribes, and so to indicate Jesus' claim upon all of Israel, an "eschatological Israel" (333).

Second, the Christian community stayed together after Jesus' death. The members believed themselves to be the Elect. They were introduced to "the mystery of his suffering." They were encouraged to endure persecution. The community was intended by Jesus to be a community that called all to metanoia and faith.

Third, there was an "ecclesiological mandate" in the sayings of Jesus, according to Anton Vögtle. The mandate bestowed Jesus' powers on his disciples in order to continue his work.

Fourth, the "Cephas-sayings" of Jesus founded the tradition by which Simon was called Cephas or Peter (Mt. 16:18f.). The meaning of these Cephas-sayings is that "Jesus wants to found his community of salvation on Simon and on his person as on a rock." The saying about the keys means that "Peter is given power to grant admission to the future kingdom" (334). Beyond these basic four provisions, says Rahner, all is left to the Spirit, to the Spirit-led history of the church, and to the history of the original church.

Part 3: The Church in the New Testament

(VII.3, p. 335). What were the characteristics of the original Christian community? It was distinct from Judaism from the start, says Rahner, possessing its own cult, reaching out to the gentiles, and viewing itself in eschatological terms (A). Then Rahner gives an overview of the portrait of the early church in various NT documents. First, he looks at the Lukan and Matthaean portraits. The Lukan is marked by its recasting of world history in Christological terms, and the Matthaean portrays Christianity in ecclesial terms (B). Paul’s letters regard the church in terms of its link to the traditions about Christ, to the Jerusalem community, and to aspects of the church echoed in the rest of the NT (C). In 1 Peter, Hebrews, the Johannine Letters, and the Apocalypse, we find a variety of ecclesial elements: the priesthood of believers, a community united in a common sacrifice, a sacramental and eschatological community (D). Finally, Rahner presents a synthesis of the NT ecclesial portraits, according to which the church is a structure, a college of various local churches, and a unity in Christ.

A. On the Self-Understanding of the Original Community (VII.3.A, 335). How did the earliest Christians understand themselves? Rahner asserts that they first called themselves “the saints” and perhaps the “community of God.” They did not see themselves as community within Israel, but rather as a community assembled by Jesus, assembled and called by him. It had its own cult (apart from Jewish worship) and eventually extended its mission to the pagan world. The Pentecost experience defined for the community its nature as “eschatological,” and showed itself to be a community “obligated” to holiness in life. Even the earliest Christians distinguished themselves from Israel.

B. On the Theology of the Church in Luke and Matthew (VII.3.B, p. 336). Luke’s special contribution to a theology of the Church was that he defined a “period of the Church” between the ascension and the parousia. There is, for Luke, a period of history belonging to Israel, belonging to Jesus, and belonging to the church. Only because of the disbelief of Israel, Luke suggests, did the church take up a mission to the pagan world.

Matthew's special contribution is a theology of the church. Schnackenburg called Matthew the "ecclesial gospel." In Matthew, the call of Jesus "does not merely address the individual in the interiority of his conscience," Rahner says, "but rather it really builds church communities around Jesus" (337). In Matthew we find a distinct law of Christ, a cult, and leadership in Peter and the Twelve.

C. On the Pauline Theology of the Church (VII.3.C, p. 337). Although Paul was not particularly concerned about drafting a “church constitution” for later times (when his direct apostolic mission was over), nevertheless he preaches a doctrine that has several ecclesial elements. For example, Paul respects the principle of tradition, seeks the approval of the Jerusalem community, and has respect for “the church in its totality with its antecedent structures” (338).

How did he understand the "church in its totality?" It was a church (1) composed of Jews and pagans (Eph. 3:4, 6), in which (2) the unfinished role of Israel in salvation history was recognized (Rom. 9-11), a church (3) founded sacramentally on Baptism and Eucharist, (4) recognized as a single entity composed of smaller, localized churches, and (5) both a cosmic reality and a heavenly presence expressed in terms of the "body of Christ."

In the Pastoral Epistles, we find an image of the church with a strong institutional stamp. This image, however, does not contradict the eschatological image of the church reflected in the earliest letters of Paul.

D. Other New Testament Ecclesiologies (VII.3.D, p. 339). In this brief section, Rahner looks at four texts significant for NT ecclesiology. The first is 1 Peter 2:4-10. It is remarkable for its strong emphasis on the church as a spiritual house, erected on the Holy Spirit, with Christ as cornerstone. In 1 Peter also we see a holy priesthood of all Christians offering spiritual sacrifice.

The second text is the Letter to the Hebrews. Its foundation is the OT idea of a pilgrim People of God (an image drawn from Exodus). It also presents the church as an eschatological community, destined to enter heaven because Christ has entered there. The church is both a "heavenly Jerusalem" in anticipation and the place of temporal struggles and trials.

The third "text" is the collection of Johannine letters. They present the "church" (without ever using the word ecclesia) in terms of its sacramental life and its foundation in the Holy Spirit. It looks to the future when the scattered children of God will form one flock.

Finally, the Apocalypse reminds the persecuted church of its eschatological dignity. The great beast persecutes the church because it is the bride and the lamb. From the flock of the redeemed in heaven, it draws strength to continue struggling and its assurance of final victory.

E. Unity and Variety in the New Testament Image of the Church (VII.3.E, p. 340). A brief overview of the NT texts related to the church suggests that the church has not one but many levels. There seem to be, however, a number of common aspects: (1) a marked institutional structure with various offices; (2) an interconnection among the various churches; (3) an inner life variously described as being on pilgrimage, as being one body, and as being composed of witnesses to the truth of Christ. Rahner concludes that, contrary to older opinions in NT research, Paul’s view of the church is not incompatible with that of the original community or with that of the so-called “early Catholicism” of Luke and the Pastoral Letters.

Although it is true to say that the same image of the church did not prevail everywhere, nevertheless one does not have to prove a single image of the church to maintain the thesis of unity. It is also true that not all of the elements of what traditional Catholic theology would call the "divine constitution of the church" were present until the beginning of the second century. For example, consider the formation of the NT canon, which was not complete until then.

But despite the fact that we see a development in the church, even in the apostolic period, still we need not conclude these developments were arbitrary or false. Rather, they give us insights (says Rahner) into the different ways we might structure today's church.

Part 4: Fundamentals of the Ecclesial Nature of Christianity

(VII.4, p. 342). In this brief part, Rahner makes an argument for the ecclesial nature of Christianity based on his transcendental theology. God’s transcendental call to human beings is not just a call to individuals, but to the essence of humanity – including humanity’s communal and social dimension (A). The essence of humanity is addressed only by a religion that comes from God, and is not a merely human projection. Because it comes from God, religion is autonomous, a divine law unto itself, and it possesses authority (B). The church belongs to the necessary historical and social mediation of salvation. To think that the Christian individual can dispense with religion and its social dimension is an illusion (C).

A. Christianity Is Necessarily Church (VII.4.A, p. 342). “Christianity must be constituted as a church.” That is Rahner’s central thesis. In saying that, he does not mean that the church must necessary be constituted in this way or that. He means rather that joining with others belongs to the very “religious existence” of humanity. It is not just a religious organization, but helps constitute the human being’s relation to God.

To be sure, the person who does not belong to a church does not thereby "lose" salvation. Indeed, such a person can have an ultimate and decisive relation to God. But church is the norm, says Rahner. Ecclesial Christianity is "the full and historical actualized Christianity of God's self-communication" (343).

The rightly-understood idea of church is one which springs from God's supernatural self-communication in Jesus Christ. This self-communication is not a relation between God and the isolated individual, but is rather a communication between God and the essence of humanity. That essence includes communal and social intercommunication.

B. The Autonomous Character of the Claim of Jesus Christ's Message (VII.4.B, p. 343). An element of what Rahner calls “the authoritative” belongs to the essence of the Christian religion. The call of God is not a merely transcendental affair, but comes in history. Religion becomes historically real not just when an individual accepts it in accord with his or her private mentality. No, it becomes real when the Christian adopts it as the religion of God, given by God to those who will treasure and conserve it. Religion must be acknowledged as a reality independent of the recipient – if it is to be something not merely at the recipient’s disposal.

To be sure, the objective, the authoritative, the institutional aspect of religion cannot take the place of Christianity's personal dimension. One must realize one's faith subjectively. Still, there is something in religion that obligates the individual, Rahner says. Religion is necessarily objective and one can orient oneself to it.

Religion must, in the end, be a "norm" for one's subjectivity. Christianity is the religion of a jealous God who makes demands on a chosen people. Without the autonomy of religion, that people is "abandoned" to its own poverty, problems, and the potentiality of distorting religion. The mission, mandate, and proclamation of the church "make the reality of salvation present for me" (344).

C. The Necessary Historical and Social Mediation of Salvation (VII.4.C, p. 345). History itself has salvific significance, says Rahner. Salvation does not take place merely in a subjective and transcendental interiority. For that reason, salvation must be mediated in history and society. The church belongs to the salvation history of God’s grace. It is “the categorical concreteness and the mediation of salvation and grace” (345). It expresses the transcendental.

It is an illusion, Rahner says, to think that human beings can organize themselves in a "reasonable" and "social" way and, at the same time, can abstain from any particular world view. Even supposedly "secular" state states make use of ideology and embody a particular world-view. In short, the "social" and the "human" dimensions of humanity are inextricably linked. So for Christianity to affirm that the Christian individual is also an "ecclesial being" with allegiance to a social view of Christian faith is not an incomprehensible statement. It reflects the fundamentally social nature of the human being.

Part 5: An Indirect Method for Showing the Legitimacy of the Catholic Church as the Church of Christ

(VII.5, p. 346). Rahner’s indirect method is not to try to solve the many historical questions about the division among the many branches of Christianity (A). His aim is rather to lay down some general principles about the necessity of Christianity being ecclesial, then apply them to his own Roman Catholic tradition (B). He starts by asserting the unity of the churches in the apostolic age, and then argues that even Evangelical Christians will admit that there existed some continuity between early Christianity and the Reformation (C). He then notes, on anthropological grounds, that it is legitimate for an adult to trust the faith handed down by earlier generations – and that Catholic theologians should acknowledge a certain legitimacy in the Protestant Christianity handed down to faithful people outside Catholicism (D). One must be satisfied that one’s church is “Christian,” but one need not become a theologian to reach that satisfaction (E). Next, Rahner tries to distinguish this basic principle from what he calls “ecclesial relativism.” His first norm is that the church of Jesus Christ had to exist until Reformation times, however unfaithful individual Christians were (F). His second norm is an appeal to experience: Rahner claims to have found the reality of Christian faith in Roman Catholicism (G). His third norm is that for any church to call itself Christian, it must exist in an authoritative way independently of the believer (H). When Rahner seeks his three norms, he finds them in Catholic Christianity (I). Moreover, he argues that the continuity between the church after the Council of Trent and the earliest church is stronger in Roman Catholicism than in any other branch of Christianity (J). Rahner then looks at the three “solas” of Evangelical Christianity (sola gratia, sola fide, sola scriptura) and asks what the Catholic can learn from them (K). He believes that these have helped all Christians to “crystallize” what is most essential about the faith (L). The divisions among Christians are interpreted as God’s effort to purify the faith (M). There is more that divided Christians have in common than that which separates them (N).

A. Introduction (VII.5.A, p. 346). The normal method of fundamental theology, namely, to offer a direct historical proof that the Roman Catholic Church is the church of Christ, involves many difficult historical questions. Rahner says that this normal method is not practical and feasible for most Catholics. So he proposes an “indirect” method. He promises to show first the formal principles of his method, and then to apply those principles to the Catholic Church.

B. On the Necessity of Church (VII.5.B, p. 347). Church is “necessary” because (1) the human being is a historical and social being, and because (2) “Christianity claims the whole person for the salvation of the whole person” (347). It is an authoritative religion because Christianity is more than an affair of pious and subjective dispositions. In addition, it makes a claim that is the concretion of God’s demands. They are demands made by Jesus and his church. So the church is, first of all, necessary. The ordinary Christian believer necessarily belongs to a concrete and historical church.

C. The Church of Jesus Christ Must Be One Church (VII.5.C, p. 348). In addition to being necessary, the church of Christ is one church. It is not just a group of Christians forming pious communities, but comes objectively and with authority as the representative of Christ. The NT, and especially the writings of John and Paul, presupposes this unity. To be sure, the church exists wherever there is true Eucharist, Baptism, and Gospel. But the existence of these three presupposes the one church.

We do not have first individual communities or churches that combine for ideological reasons into a single church. No, the single reality that is church comes first, and manifests itself in the various communities. This is Paul's basic teaching, and Rahner puts it this way: "one and the same people of God filled with the Spirit of God becomes manifest in every local community" (349). Although the various "churches" of early Christianity were spread out and apparently independent, they had common features. Rahner lists them as follows: they were founded by those who carried out the mission of Jesus, they were led by an apostle (even if he was not present), they exchanged letters, and they were built upon Peter as the rock.

Even Protestant Christians recognize that the oneness and unity of the church is not for Christians to decide as they will. While there remains much disagreement about how the Christian church is to be one, nevertheless the conviction exists that there ought to be one church, and that its unity has not yet been sufficiently realized.

D. Legitimate Confidence in One's Own Ecclesial Community (VII.5.D, p. 350). Individual Christians have a right to assume that their ecclesial existence is legitimate. To be sure, individuals can and do break out of the situation of their existence, encounter an “existentiell revolution,” and conclude that the religion of their parents is inauthentic. But this is not the norm. No one can project the totality of his existence in an absolutely new way. The norm is to presume the legitimacy of the ecclesial situation bestowed by history. One trusts one’s parents, accepts one’s culture, and presumes the legitimacy of received values.

If this is true, then "it makes things more difficult for Catholic fundamental theology as an apologetic for the Roman Catholic Church which is also intended for other Christians" (351). How is Catholic theology to "come to terms with the fact of this real and genuine Christian experience which comes from other ecclesial denominations"? (351). Every genuine Christian experience, including the experience of Protestant Christians, "must be regarded as an experience of the power of our existence which is really grounded in the mystery of God" (351).

E. Criteria and Presuppositions (VII.5.E, 352). All Christians find themselves in a concrete experience of Christianity, in a specific Christian church. Good conscience demands that they examine whether this church contradicts the basic substance of Christianity. Further, Christians must judge how closely their church stands to the origins of Christianity in its ecclesial constitution. To be sure, ordinary Christians do not have to master all the exegetical, historical, and dogmatic questions of technical theology. But they must be satisfied that their church is truly Christian – however incomplete the basis for reflection is.

F. The Criterion of Continuity with the Origin as a Defense Against Ecclesiological Relativism (VII.5.F, p. 352). We can rely upon the concrete Christian church that has come to us, says Rahner, “if it has the closest possible historical approximation to the original Christian church of Jesus Christ” (352-353). The goal of all Christians is to affirm that their own church is indeed “the church of Christ.”

Although many people today would say that the church to which one wants to belong is "a question merely of historical accident and individual taste," nevertheless Rahner disagrees. Such a view was completely foreign to the sixteenth-century Reformers. They presumed that the true church of Jesus Christ had to exist somewhere. The Catholic Church could not be the true church, they agreed, because it lacked the basic elements of the Augsburg Confession. In it they found no genuine preaching of the gospel, no legitimate authority, and no correct administration of the sacraments of Baptism and Eucharist.

Ecclesial relativism presupposes either that the true church of Christ as he willed it does not exist, or that it exists to such an extent among all the divided church "that it does not really have to be brought about" (353).

Against this relativism, Rahner proposes what he calls his first norm. It is that the Christian church began with Jesus Christ. The church of the intervening centuries, however depraved and unfaithful, supplied a continuity from the time of Jesus to Reformation times. No Protestant Christian, says Rahner, will argue that the Christian church began with the Reformation. Many Protestants will assert that their own churches have a concrete, historical continuity with the church of original Christianity.

G. The Criterion of Preserving the Basic Substance of Christianity (VII.5.G, p. 354). The second norm or principle in Rahner’s indirect method of justifying Catholic Christianity is that the “basic substance” of Christianity “may not be fundamentally denied in concrete Catholicism” (354). With this norm, Rahner departs from traditional ecclesiology. He does not want to argue, he says, that the basic substance of Christianity is guaranteed by the structures of Roman Catholicism. Instead he argues that he, in his concrete experience of faith, has experienced the reality of Christianity. His concrete experience as a Roman Catholic “does not contradict the basic substance of Christianity” which he has found in his own existence.

The true church can exist only where the gospel is preached in its purity, according to the Augsburg Confession, and that (Rahner says) is perfectly correct. An ecclesial community that denies a basic principle of Christianity cannot be the true church of Christ. So Rahner appeals to the Holy Spirit. He says that the Spirit bears witness to the reality of his own Christian experience.

H. The Criterion of Objective Authority (VII.5.H, p. 355). Rahner’s third norm or principle is that “the religious community of church must obviously exist as a reality which is independent of my subjectivity” (355). The church has an authority which stands over the believer and articulates a Christian reality which can never be reduced to an individual’s interpretation. Without a doubt, every objective reality is mediated in one’s own conscience. For me to perceive a Christian teaching as true, it must be true for me. But this does not alter the Rahnerian postulate: “Christian religiosity is not yet religion unless it includes the concrete and social reality of a church which is independent of me” (355). An authentically Christian church has an authority that is greater than one’s own subjective judgment.

vI. The Special Application of These Criteria in Our Situation (VII.5.I, p. 356). In this section, Rahner lays the basis for his application of the three norms, i.e., continuity, subjectivity, and objective authority. First, Christian truths do not all have the same existentiell and salvific significance, says Rahner, because there is a hierarchy of truths. The acknowledgment of this hierarchy, referred to in the Vatican II Decree on Ecumenism (Unitatis redintegratio, no. 11), means that some truths of the faith are more foundational than others.

Next, Rahner says that "other Christians" live in grace, are filled, with Spirit, are justified, and so on. To an extent, they are already united with other Christians. Finally, he says that only Evangelical Christianity (i.e., the Protestantism that remains close to its pre-Reformation roots) can be a question for Roman Catholics. Evangelical Christianity belongs, says Rahner, to the Roman Catholic's own history. By contrast, the Christianity of, say, Jehovah's Witnesses or the Latter Day Saints has severed its relation to the Reformation.

J. The Historical Continuity of the Catholic Church (VII.5.J, p. 357). Rahner’s basic conviction is that the Catholic Church most decisively accords with his three norms or principles. “It possesses in the concrete a closer, more evident, and less encumbered historical continuity with the church of the past going all the way back to apostolic times” (357).

To be sure, Rahner refuses to establish this connection by means of a detailed investigation. He says that such an investigation is beyond the scope of the Foundations. He believes such an investigation is unnecessary. "The historical continuity between the post-tridentine and post-Reformation church and the ancient church is greater, more evident and less ambiguous in the Catholic church," he says, "than in the other ecclesial communities, including those of Evangelical Christianity" (357).

Rahner insists upon the Petrine Office, which provides a continuity with the "Roman episcopacy" of the ancient church. It is hard for the Evangelical church to declare, he suggests, that this feature is superfluous or unchristian. Evangelicals rightly insist, he says, on justification by faith, gospel, Baptism and Eucharist. And no one can deny that the Roman Catholic Church of the Middle Ages showed "massive tendencies" in its life, practice, and mentality that contradicted the central concerns of Evangelicals.

Having said that, however, Rahner makes a case for the Catholic's confidence in today's church. The contemporary Catholic need not concede, he says, that the church of the Middle Ages taught something "which was so contrary to the real and basic concerns of the reformers" (359) that its teaching would force him or her out of the Catholic church.

K. The Criterion of Preserving the Basic Substance in the Light of Reformation Controversies (VII.5.K, p. 359). Rahner proposes to examine the three basic “only’s” of the Reformation – only grace, only faith, and only scripture – in order to show that membership in the Catholic Church is possible for the conscientious Christian.

K (i). Sola Gratia: By Grace Alone (VII.5.K.i, p. 359). In this section, Rahner aims to show that the Evangelical linchpin, the doctrine that we are saved by God’s grace alone, is no less a linchpin for Roman Catholics. To be sure, Catholics reject predestination in the name of human freedom. But Protestants insist upon human freedom as well. All Christians must freely accept that their salvation is God’s initiative. Humans contribute nothing to salvation that is not, first and foremost, God’s free gift. In that sense, Protestants and Catholics agree.

K (ii). Sola Fide: By Faith Alone (VII.5.K.ii, p. 360). Sola Fide is the subjective side, Rahner says, of the Sola Gratia doctrine. The response to God’s grace is not a “work” of human beings, but “faith” in Paul’s sense. Faith is, of course, based on interior hope and must be fulfilled by love. Scholastic theology may have distinguished these, Rahner admits, in a “somewhat schematic” fashion. But they remain interconnected. To this Evangelical theology cannot object.

K (iii). Sola Scriptura: Scripture Alone (VII.5.K.iii, p. 361). The third basic “sola” is one against which Catholics may object. Catholics insist that the gospel comes from scripture and tradition, and not from scripture alone. Rahner starts from the concrete position of scripture studies in Evangelical Christianity today. Evangelicals will grant, he says, that scripture is a product of the church. It is based on the preaching of the living church, and so is the “result” of tradition. One cannot explain the formation of the canon without reference to the relation between scripture and tradition.

Rahner than goes on to assert that Evangelical Christianity has abandoned the principle of "verbal" inspiration of scripture. The doctrine of verbal inspiration views scripture as "the one and only product which comes immediately from God independently of any historical . . . process of becoming" (362). This has been abandoned, Rahner, claims. Because it has been abandoned, he says, one cannot "still maintain the principle of scripture alone in the sense which it had at the time of the reformation" (362).

Finally, Rahner argues that the principle of scripture as a norma non normata (a norm which is not mediated by others) can still be affirmed by Catholics. It is affirmed in two ways: first, in the sense that the church "does not receive any new revelation over and beyond this scripture" (363); and second, that the task of the church's teaching office is "to remain within the ultimate and eschatological revelation which has been handed down" (363) in scripture.

The substance of faith is immutable, but it can develop. Developments need to be judged by an objective authority, and the Catholic church claims that it can give a basic interpretation of scripture that is binding on individual Christians. God's word in scripture is capable of forming faith, but it does so (the Catholic believes) in the preaching of the concrete church. The norm for the teaching office in the Catholic church is not its own subjective view, but scripture itself (says Rahner), "for it does not receive any new revelations" (365).

L. The Three Reformation "Only's" and Catholicism: The Result (VII.5.L, p. 365). The three Reformation “only’s” should not lead one out of the Catholic Church, says Rahner. On the contrary, they have a central place in Catholicism. Other Evangelical theologies (e.g., Rudolf Bultmann’s theology of demythologizing) may well lead one out, but not the core teachings of the Reformers, because they embraced the traditional creeds.

M. The Positive Significance of Evangelical Christianity for the Catholic Church (VII.5.M, p. 366). Evangelical Christianity has significance for Catholic Christianity. It has crystallized the Christian faith, reduced it “to the ultimate, to what is most specific, to the animating power, and to that which gives Christianity its ultimate meaning” (367). Thanks to the “goad” of the Reformation, there has been a “corrective influence” on Catholics. Evangelical Christianity belongs to the historical moments that have had a powerful and beneficial impact on Catholicism.

N. The Fundamental Unity of Christianity and the Question About the "Meaning" of the Division (VII.5.N, p. 367). Why did God allow the division of Christianity? In order to answer this question, Rahner lays down two important assumptions: first, that Christians are united in a more radical sense than they are divided; and second, that the majority of Christians exist in a “guiltless” relation to their own churches and to other churches.

Having said that, Rahner concludes that the division among the Christian churches was allowed by God in order to make the reality of Christianity more clearly seen. Without the division, we would not experience the truths of Christianity as clearly as we do. "We have to force each other," Rahner says, "mutually to be and to become as Christian as possible" (369). This, he hopes, will help those from different churches to develop a theological unity, each working from within different traditions.

Part 6: Scripture as the Church's Book

(VII.6, p. 369). This section begins with a hermeneutical discussion. Scripture is not the immediate Word of God, says Rahner, but is understood as such when human beings hear it as God’s Word in an experience of grace (A). In the Christian Church, the scriptures function as the link between God’s decisive act on behalf of the world and the life and proclamation of Jesus (B). The Church of the Apostles can be said to have objectified itself in scripture, and we turn to scripture to know that early church (C). Although it was not the recognition of scripture by the church that made it inspired, nevertheless we can say that the essence of scripture is derived from the essence of the church (D). God is the author of scripture, in the sense that God inspired it by inspiring the church (E). Scripture is inerrant in that it cannot lead us away from God’s truth, but scripture must be correctly interpreted (F). The teaching office of the church, far from being “above scripture,” is bound to the scripture as the sign of its origins and of the transcendental truth to which it is committed (G). The formation of the scripture is a “fundamental moment” in Christian tradition, not a separate source of truth alongside of tradition (H).

A. Some References to Earlier Discussions (VII.6.A, p. 370). Rahner begins by reminding readers of the relation between transcendental and historical reflection. This is a theme which, in Rahner’s hands, subordinates the historical words of scripture to the transcendental Word of salvation history. According to this transcendental word, God invites the human being to hear God in the intimacy of his or her conscience and to respond in a free decision. Salvation history reaches its goal and climax, Rahner concedes, when it becomes a theme in explicit revelatory language. But scripture can only be understood as the Word of God when it becomes, in an experience of grace, a communication from God to the hearer.

B. The Church's Book (VII.6.B, p. 371). The scriptures remain normative for the church. They bind the church to its origins. Moreover, the scriptures bind God’s transcendental turn to the world along with the proclamation and life of Jesus. Finally, the scriptures express the early church as it understood itself. Without the scriptures, says Rahner, we would not be able to understand inspiration or the church itself which holds the scriptures to be inspired.

C. The Apostolic Age (VII.6.C, p. 371). The apostolic age “ended” with the writing of the final books of the NT, circa 110-130. The apostolic age is normative for defining the canon of scripture. But the canon, by means of a hermeneutical circle, defines what we know the apostolic age to be. So Rahner concludes that the apostolic age objectified itself in scripture, and now the scripture “has” the character of the apostolic age.

D. The Formation of the Canon (VII.6.D, p. 372). Rahner insists that the canon of scripture was recognized and constituted by the early church. Having said that, however, he cautions us. One cannot say that the church’s recognition of scripture is what made it inspired and canonical. Vatican I denied this, and Rahner denies it as well. But the origin of scripture took place within a circumscribed series of moments. They are akin to the formation of the church, and the essence of scripture is derived from the essence of the church, even though the two do not coincide in time. The formation of the canon “belongs to” the formation of the church.

E. The Inspiration of Scripture (VII.6.E, p. 374). The traditional teaching of the church is that God is the “author” of scripture. Is there a sense, Rahner asks, in which we can understand this in a way that is not mythological? We cannot understand it adequately if we try to save, by means of psychological theories, the notion of God as the “literary” author. That reduces the human authors to the status of being merely secretaries of the divine.

A word about God, even such a word caused by God, would not be a word of God unless God truly offers it. To be God's own self-expression, the word would have to be "effected by God" and "borne by grace" in a process of our hearing it, a process "borne by God's Spirit" (374). God is the "author" of scripture in that God inspired it, inspired it by founding the church.

"The human authors of Holy Scripture work exactly like other human authors," says Rahner, "nor do they have to know anything about their being inspired in reflexive knowledge" (375). God is the author of scripture in that God willed the church.

F. The Inerrancy of Scripture (VII.6.F, p. 375). Vatican II stated that the scriptures teach “with certainty, with fidelity, and without error the truth which God wanted recorded” (Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum, art. 11, as cited on Rahner’s p. 375). But inerrancy must not be understood, Rahner warns, in connection with the discredited idea of verbal inspiration. Dei Verbum leaves open the question of the identity of the truths which God placed in the Scriptures “for our salvation.” It leaves us to ask whether that phrase is meant to explain the truths (i.e., they are truths “for our salvation”) or to restrict them (inerrancy does not extend beyond those salvific truths).

Rahner affirms unambiguously that the scriptures objectify God's offer of salvation. They are inerrant in that they cannot lead one away from God's truth. But all scripture must be interpreted in the context of its genre, and further we must distinguish between the "correctness" of a saying and the "truth" it conveys. A saying may be correct and erroneous in that it is historically, scientifically, or even morally flawed--and yet may still contain a truth.

Just as the "analogy of faith" suggests that we must interpret the teachings of the church in their proper context, so the "analogy of scripture" holds for interpreting individual verses. The meaning of the scriptures depends on the context in which they are placed.

G. Scripture and Teaching Office (VII.6.G, p. 377). The magisterium does not stand “above” scripture, says Rahner. The magisterium is, first of all, bound to the faith of the early church which gave rise to scripture. Secondly, the consciousness of the early church is “objectified” in scripture. The magisterium, far from being “above” scripture, aims to witness to the truth of scripture.

H. Scripture and Tradition (VII.6.H, p. 377). Scripture is the “objectification” of the original church’s consciousness of faith. As an example of this consciousness of faith, Rahner points to the formation of the canon. The canon could not be established by scripture alone. The formation of the canon is, Rahner says, a “fundamental moment” in tradition. However, tradition is not, alongside of scripture, a second source of the gospel with a separate content. Even Evangelical Christian leaders recognize that scripture objectifies the original church’s living consciousness. They freely confess, says Rahner, that scripture testifies to a legitimate pluralism in the church’s unity, a pluralism in the one church’s “single and living consciousness of the faith” (378). Tradition and scripture both express the living consciousness of the original church.

Part 7: On the Church's Teaching Office

(VII.7, p. 378). The church’s magisterium confronts the believer with a problem. It is that the magisterium as such did not exist in the Old Testament or before the church came into being (A). So how are we to interpret it? Rahner asserts that the magisterium is part of God’s will in proclaiming truth and establishing a church (B). The church perseveres in the truth because it participates in God’s offer of the divine self in truth and love (C). The issue is not “whether” the church perseveres, but “how.” It perseveres by confronting the Christian with the challenging demand of Christ to believe (D). Faith aims, not at the formulation of propositions arranged in a hierarchy, but at a living relationship to God (E). The importance of propositions cannot be avoided, however, and Rahner asks if the Catholic Church, by defining doctrines in an infallible way, raises an insuperable obstacle to the reunion with Evangelical Christians (F). To answer, he first asserts that the ascription to the pope of infallible teaching authority is fundamentally no different than the time-honored ascription to the whole Church of infallibility (G). Finally, Rahner affirms that the doctrines of the Immaculate Conception and of the Assumption of Mary assert nothing other than the Mary has realized the promise in which every Christian hopes (H). The so-called “new doctrines” are not new, but developments of ancient Christian teaching.

A. The Problem of the Uniqueness of an "Ecclesial Teaching Office" (VII.7.A, p. 378). The problem of the teaching office lies in the fact that it did not exist in OT times or before the church of Christ. Indeed, the official teachers of OT times were acknowledged capable of falling away from God, and in fact did not recognize Jesus Christ.

For Catholic Christians, it cannot suffice to proclaim that God endowed the episcopate (with Peter and his successors as the head) "with formal authority of a fundamental kind" (379). A formalization of this kind does not explain anything about the relation between formal teaching authority and the essence of the church.

B. The Christological Reason for the Teaching Office (VII.7.B, p. 379). The fundamental reason for the teaching office begins with Jesus Christ. In Christ, God’s self-communication became tangible and irreversible. The historical manifestation of Jesus’ coming includes the rise of the church and its teaching office. That is the real reason for the authoritative magisterium. In the church, God expresses the divine truth and love. God encompasses human freedom with grace in such a way that “man’s freedom as a whole really accepts this truth and preserves it” (379). By extension, the Catholic community accepts and preserves the magisterium as an extension of God’s own truth. The teaching office belongs to God’s activity of proclaiming the truth.

C. The Church and Perseverance in the Truth (VII.7.C, p. 379). The church is “the ongoing presence and the historical tangibility of this ultimate and victorious word of God in Jesus Christ” (379). Its task is to “found” or to usher in the “eschatological age.” To do so, it must truly “participate” in God’s offer of the divine self as truth and love. By participating in God’s offer, the church can never lose the truth and love which belong to God. How can the church be preserved in truth? Because in Christ, God has (1) “encompassed every conceivable rejection” and (2) has “redeemed man’s freedom and his history” (380). It is not a human accomplishment, but God’s grace, i.e., God’s desire to maintain the victory of Christ. God has made a gift of the divine self and enables us to remain faithful – to call one another to faithfulness.

As for disputes between Catholic and Evangelical Christians, Rahner says that the issue is not whether the church of Jesus Christ can lose the truth, for it cannot; the question is rather how God triumphs and makes the divine presence victorious. If the Catholic professes that the church has a hierarchical structure, then the Catholic cannot allow himself or herself to be put into the dilemma of having to choose between God's truth or the structure of the church. The dilemma is "impossible," says Rahner, because the church's teaching authority speaks in the name of Christ, not merely from its own subjectivity but because it was "sent" just as Christ was. Because the church was sent by Christ to found the eschatological age, the church "as a whole" cannot lose Christ's truth and love.

D. Teaching Authority According to the Catholic Understanding of the Church (VII.7.D, p. 381). What does it mean that the Church “perseveres in” and “can never lose” the truth? Rahner says that, when the Church confronts the believing Christian in its teaching with “an ultimate demand in the name of Christ,” then “God’s grace and power prevent this teaching authority from losing the truth of Christ” (381). This teaching authority does not offer any new revelation, but “simply interprets, develops and actualizes in ever new historical concretions the message of Christ” (381). It is the “organ” and “embodiment” of the church’s understanding of faith.

It must be said, however, that the teaching office speaks with all of its authority "only in relatively rare instances" (381). Usually, the pronouncements of official teachers are "provisional and limited exercises" of the real authority which exists in the total consciousness of the faith. The obligation of the individual Christian to obey this authority "varies a great deal depending o the level of the authority exercised" (381). Evangelical Christianity has a teaching authority too, but it does not declare itself absolute and ultimately binding.

E. The "Hierarchy of Truths" and Its Subjective Appropriation (VII.7.E, p. 382). When we speak of a hierarchy of truths, we mean that each of the truths of faith, while all are revealed, have a “different relationship to the real core of faith” (382). While each truth can be stated as a proposition materially distinct from every other, they are grasped altogether. The Christian accepts them altogether, not as a series of acts which we take one at a time or accept each individually. The act of faith does not aim at human propositions but at a relationship to God.

When we appropriate the truths of faith, we do so in a way that each truth has a "different" relationship "to the core and to the substance of Christian faith" (383). One finds one's own understanding of the faith within a community. "But this does not mean, however, that he [the believer] is required to assimilate the faith in all of the differentiated nuances which it has objectively and has acquired in history" (383). Rather, one lives in the implicit faith of the church, and need not be concerned about details which do not touch the believer in the concrete.

Indeed, the details can distract one from the heart of the message. "We even have to say," Rahner asserts, "that many times it would be better if Christians knew less about certain details of the Catholic catechism, but had really grasped the ultimate and decisive questions in a genuine and profound way" (383). Faith depends less on external and formal teaching than on the interior reality of what is believed.

F. The Question of the Post-tridentine Development of Dogma (VII.7.F, p. 384). Has the Catholic Church raised insuperable obstacles to reunion with Protestant Christians by its explicit dogmatic teachings since the 16th century? Have doctrines about the teaching authority of the pope, the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and Assumption of Mary into heaven, been offered as “new” revelations? Certainly, an Evangelical would have to accept these doctrines if he or she wanted to be a Catholic, and they go beyond what was disputed at the time of the Reformation.

G. The Primacy and Teaching Authority of the Bishop of Rome (VII.7.G, p. 384). To answer the questions about the post-tridentine development of dogma, Rahner asserts that the doctrine about the authority of the Church is not new. The doctrine of the infallible teaching office of the Church was held before the Reformation, he says, although it was not always ascribed explicitly to the pope. The question of today is not about the authority of the Church per se, but rather about the authority of the pope.

Rahner begins his answer to the question by noting two qualifications to papal authority. It is not the authority of a private person but of an office. By virtue of this office, the pope may exercise an infallible teaching authority in the interpretation of revelation, i.e., of scripture and tradition. So infallible teaching is exercised in a public and official manner in the interpretation of revelation.

Having asserted these qualifications, Rahner states that the exercise of papal authority is nothing other than an ascription to the Pope of an authority believed throughout Christian history to be present in the church and in ecumenical councils. To assert this about the Pope is (theologically speaking) no more difficult than to assert it of the whole church or of ecumenical councils, says Rahner, and "more natural and sensible from a human point of view" (385). It is more natural and sensible if we regard the pope as "acting as the head of the church and as the person who represents the whole college of bishops" (385). Democratic considerations, says Rahner, are "out of place for the church and for the issue in question" (385).

He goes on to say a few more things relevant to the question of democracy. "We are not dealing here with a collective discovery of truth," he says, "where basically and by the very nature of the case more people really do have a greater chance to discover the truth than an individual has" (385). It is not a matter of intelligence or education, but of the gift of the Spirit. It is no more difficult to say that a person can discern and express the truth than to say that a society of church can discern and express it.

Hence the Catholic Church cannot be said to have erred when it declared that the primacy and power of the pope belong to the essence of Christianity. Indeed, Rahner suggests that Evangelical theology is in error. For such theology does not deny solely that the pope can oblige the Christian conscience. It denies moreover that no council or tangible authority can oblige the conscience. Prior to the Reformation, an authority akin to the authority of scripture was ascribed to ecumenical councils. The Reformation Churches deny even that--a far greater and more significant denial than the denial of post-tridentine developments. One cannot rightly protest against papal primacy, Rahner concludes, in the name of a general "Christianity," because Christianity all along has presumed the unity of the churches under a concrete head.

H. The "New" Marian Dogmas (VII.7.H, p. 387). In order to understand the Immaculate Conception and Assumption of Mary, one must believe in the incarnation of the eternal Word in human flesh. That is Rahner’s starting point. Mary is not just a character in the biography of Jesus, he says, but one who has “an explicit historical role in the history of salvation” (387).

To be sure, says Rahner, there is no explicit testimony to the Marian dogmas in Scripture or in the explicit tradition of the first centuries. Rahner chooses not to explore the emergence and development of the Marian dogmas. But he affirms that they reflect what most Christians believe about salvation and eschatology.

At their heart, the Marian dogmas stated "that Mary is someone who has been redeemed radically" (387). She was redeemed as one who helped to "realize" the salvation of the world, who bore the fruit of salvation, and who "received" salvation. Evangelicals may protest that the Immaculate Conception undercuts or denies the universality of original sin. But Rahner replies that it is quite biblical to affirm that Adam's sin has been "transcended and encompassed by God's salvific will and by the redemption of Christ" (387).

All of us are sanctified and redeemed insofar as we have our origin in Christ, just as we are sinners due to our origin in Adam. The Immaculate Conception proclaims that the Mother of God "was conceived and willed from the beginning by God's absolute salvific will as someone who was to receive salvation in faith and love" (388). She was the first to be redeemed.

And what of the Assumption? It says about Mary, claims Rahner, what we profess about ourselves in the creed when we refer to the resurrection of the body and eternal life. The Assumption proclaims that the fulfillment of Mary's life--the resurrection of her body and her eternal life--took place with her death, with her own eschatology, and with her very person as "the most radically successful instance of redemption" (388). What we profess about Mary, says Rahner, is what we profess about our hope for ourselves.

Part 8: The Christian in the Life of the Church

(VII.8, p. 389). In this brief section, Rahner starts by affirming the ecclesial life of the church as the realm of our Christian existence. Just as we are bound to our families, even in recognizing their limitations, so we are bound to the church (A). Ecclesial existence is necessary for the Christian, but the Christian acknowledges that there is a difference between ecclesial and divine laws (B). While rejecting subjectivity and situationalism, Rahner affirms that church law is relative, while divine law encompasses church law and is absolute (C). The church is not one among other groups competing for people’s allegiance in a pluralistic society, but the place where faithful people recognize that God offers the divine life to all, and where they revere that divine life in its many forms (D).

A. On the Ecclesial Nature of a Christian (VII.8.A, p. 389). Does one become a Christian by gaining a sudden religious enthusiasm or by experiencing what no one else has experienced? No, Christianity comes to the individual through history, Rahner says. By that he means from a people, from family, from the Holy Spirit objectified in the concrete and the particular. It comes from a profession of faith, from a cult, from a community.

The church exists because, without it, Christianity (if it existed at all) would be incomplete. It would be only a soul without a body, a transcendental essence without a historical constitution, an individual without any possibility of intercommunication.

This does not mean, however, that one must have illusions about the church. One loves the church, not for what it might be, but for what it is. That love makes a claim on us. Just as love for one's parents is binding (despite the fact that we see their finitude and limitations), so love for the church is binding. We accept the church as the realm of our Christian existence, even with the church's failings "and perhaps even false developments" (390). We are obliged, says Rahner, to recognize the church as the assembly that we ourselves constitute, even with its failures. The real thing that is the church manifests itself in us.

B. On Law and Order in the Church (VII.8.B, p. 391). Catholics understand the hierarchical structure of the church as a necessity of labor, of functions, and even of rights. This understanding should not be seen merely as a pragmatic concession. “There has to be in the church a holy order, a holy law, and hence also a power which may and must be exercised juridically by one person in relation to others” (391). There is a legitimate power to lead and govern. In every Christian community, the individual has an obligation in conscience to church authority.

To be sure, there is a difference between a "divine law" and the claims made by the church upon the conscience of the Catholic Christian "on the basis of its power to govern" (391). Church law is mutable, divine law is not. "It is also subject to the criticism and to the desires for change on the part of the faithful" (391). The church stands under the divine law. Church laws are addressed to the conscience of individual Catholic Christians, but their relationship to church laws is "much looser and much freer" than their relationship to God's laws.

How are we to distinguish between church laws and divine laws? Rahner does not treat this in detail, but he gives an example. Keeping the sabbath holy is a divine law. The church's command to attend Mass on Sunday differs from the third commandment and "cannot be traced back" to it. Church law does not bind the conscience in the same way that a divine command is binding.

C. Levels of Relativity in the Law (VII.8.C, p. 392). In this section, Rahner adds precision to his earlier remarks about church law. He states that church laws demand loyal obedience and have a right to make that demand. But there is a “discrepancy,” Rahner says, between the individual conscience and “what is regulated and can be regulated by the church” (393). There is“relativity” in the church with regard to its law.

Some laws concern the church's social order, says Rahner, and are not "a divine law either of revelation or of nature" (393). He gives three examples. First, the law that witnesses are required for the validity of marriage even when no priest is available. Does this law always hold? Second, the law that a person once married must prove the nullity of the marriage in order to marry again. What if there was no marriage but the person cannot prove it? Third, the law that only a bishop can ordain. Could not a priest in, let us say, a refugee situation, ordain another? Basically, Rahner is raising the possibility that one need not always and in every case follow the letter of the law when the Spirit counsels something else. The church's principles must be maintained, even when a faithful interpretation of them puts one into conflict with the church's disciplinary laws.

Situational ethics has been rejected by the church, and Rahner is not proposing a "situational law." He does not intend to propose a theory that would deny objective law and subject it to capricious interpretations. The law proposed by Rahner is nothing other than the long-established principles of Greek philosophy, namely epikeia and the force of custom. Even the sacraments, which are one instance of divine law, can be subsumed under another instance of that law. The example Rahner gives is from the Council of Trent. It declared that, in spiritual (as distinct from sacramental) communion, the grace of justification is present, even when the sacrament is missing. The law governing the actual sacrament is subsumed under the doctrine of justification. The actual sacrament need not be present for communion with God to be real.

Does this relativity of church law deprive it of all power and validity? No. It has power and validity, in short, true effectiveness, when it is recognized by the moral conscience of the individual. Until it is recognized by the conscience church law is not the norm of conscience. But once recognized, the law has power and validity. To be sure, the law remains relative. But a law can be both authoritative and relative.

The limitations of our knowledge cannot always be overcome by the intelligence of the church. We cannot simply state that, because our knowledge is limited, we should adhere always to the letter of the church's law. There are situations in which the letter of the law does not suffice. In these situations, a person must proceed according to conscience and without hope of official church support. Universal laws cannot and do not cover concrete instances completely. We can imagine a situation in which a person may be justified before God and lawbreaker before the church. The person remains subject to church law, and may well be punished for disobedience. But the law of the church recognizes that it must leave room for the free moral decision of individuals.

Rahner reiterates that he is acknowledging the relativity of law, not proposing a "situational" interpretation governed by subjectivity. Law is a real expression of the church and of God's intention for it. But law can neither be simply identified with God's will and Spirit, nor dismissed in libertinism.

D. The Church as the Place for Love of God and of Neighbor (VII.8.D, p. 398). The church is, for the Christian, the place for the love of both God and neighbor. In these two loves, one discovers one’s true essence, says Rahner; at the same time, these loves are a gift, and not one’s own possession. The church is the place where we have “the assurance and promise” that God loves us.

When a person encounters God, he or she wants to experience God, not only in the ultimate depth of conscience, but also in something tangible. The church is the tangible place. Human love is something necessary to life, yes; but "from a human point of view," says Rahner, human love "reaches a dead end" and "comes to naught" (399). It attempts to bridge the chasm that divides people, but human love has no final guarantee of ultimate success. The ultimate success of human love exists in a process whose fulfillment lies in hope.

The pledge of this hope is sacramentally present in the church. "Interpersonal love can find ultimate success only if it takes place within the realm of God" (399). It is "given in hope" and "present in the church" (399).

D. The Uniqueness of the Christian Offer of Meaning in a Pluralistic Society (VII.8.D, p. 400). The church often seems to be no more than one among other groups in a pluralistic society, each competing for a claim upon us, each offering a limited world view. But Rahner says that the church transcends pluralistic life. It does so, first of all, because it does not offer an ideology, but liberation into the mystery of God. The church is not in competition with other groups, but a place where faith in the transcendental God is expressed.

Secondly, non-Christians are not living out their existence in opposition to Christianity, says Rahner. The Christian recognizes the non-Christian as the one to whom God has offered the divine self as freedom. Whenever one accepts one's existence with resolve and trust, confident that it has meaning, one is accepting God. Christians stand beyond pluralistic confusion without despising it. They affirm all people who hear God's word and who respond to it with good will.